

Explanatory Notes on the Proposed Readjustment of Procedures
for the Review of SIGINT and Reconnaissance Programs

1. The proposed Council is simply an enlargement of the present Executive Committee of the NRO. Its purpose would be to advise the Secretary of Defense on matters relating to the National Reconnaissance Program (NRP) and the national SIGINT program (NSIP). CIA and DIA programs would continue to be administered and programmed as at present. The DCI would continue to participate in the review of the CIP.

2. The proposal is based generally on the concept of the present NRO Agreement. The managerial responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense and the Directors, NSA and NRO are recognized. Institutional arrangements are suggested for the provision of guidance concerning the needs of the intelligence community for these programs and concerning the level and scope of activity which the intelligence community thinks appropriate for particular elements of these programs. A Board, representing the basic consumers -- State, Defense and the DCI -- (the Intelligence Advisory Council) is made responsible for recommending policy, emphasis and direction for the development and utilization of resources for reconnaissance and SIGINT programs. It should be noted that the

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members of this Board are the same people who sit on the 303 Committee.

3. As far as the role of the intelligence community is concerned, the idea is that the responsibilities of USIB under NSCID 1 for determining intelligence objectives and priorities need not be disturbed. The DCI, however, would establish a new Board, consisting of the DDCI as Chairman and appropriate representatives of the principal consumers of intelligence data and producers of substantive intelligence, e.g., CIA, DIA and JCS. The function of this Board would be to translate the objectives of intelligence activity, as determined by USIB, into specific programs and resources. For this purpose it would have a staff (run by the Chairman) and would task USIB committees.

4. An assumption of this proposal is that resources which would be identified as tactical and primarily required to support the immediate needs of a major military command will be transferred from the CIP to the CIP but will continue to be carried as "non-add items" in the CIP. A JIRG type review should be initiated to identify these resources.

5. The scheme proposed does not purport to deal with "requirements" as such. This is because the word "requirements" seems too ambiguous to be very helpful in determining the institutional requirements best calculated to control and rationalize intelligence. A "requirement" can be merely a question asked by an analyst, or

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to which is more or less available from existing sources or systems. On the other hand, it can be a "requirement" for a new system, activity or piece of equipment. There is a "requirement" for information about Soviet intentions in Berlin. There may be a "requirement" for a new high resolution, general search reconnaissance system.

6. The Intelligence Resources Board would identify and confirm intelligence needs for resources or activities. The Intelligence Advisory Board would be guided by the findings of the Intelligence Resources Board. Information would be communicated through the DCI. The Intelligence Advisory Board would also have the benefit of studies and advice from the Defense Department staff. Presumably the Defense Department staff would focus primarily on questions of essentially managerial concern such as procurement, construction, personnel administration, logistics, etc.

7. The scheme would probably work better if a position of Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense for Special Projects could be established. This position would be a GS 13; have perhaps an assistant or two; have no substantive responsibility but be responsible for ensuring that individual programs receive appropriate staff review by appropriate staff elements of DoD. Obviously establishment of such a position is a matter exclusively within the discretion of the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

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


8. The Intelligence Advisory Council could establish subcommittees, for example on research and development.

9. The Secretary of Defense would make final budgetary decisions based on recommendations from the Intelligence Advisory Council and such staff reviews as he, or the Deputy Secretary, think appropriate. The Directors, NRO and NSA would act as Program Action Officers but would arrange for staff review of particular aspects of their programs with appropriate staff sections of DoD with the Assistant for Special Projects (if created).

10. The DCI would of course continue to have a right of direct access and appeal to the President where, in his opinion, a decision of the Secretary of Defense is likely to have a substantial and adverse effect the national intelligence effort.

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D R A F T

18 April 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: D/DCI/NIPE

SUBJECT: Target Oriented Display (TOD)


1. [] gave my group a short briefing on the Target Oriented Display (TOD) this morning. I was very impressed by the progress that has been made. In this memo I am attempting to convey one idea for where one might go from here.

2. As I view the TOD it consists primarily of a cost data base which can be queried in the resolution of a decision issue. For example, if the decision issue is to buy 100 drones or 200 drones, the TOD can furnish the costs of these two alternatives, broken down by collection, production, etc., or by geographical areas to which the costs can be charged, or by specific intelligence questions answerable such as ICBM, ABM, etc. Not to be forgotten is what I consider to be the secondary role of TOD, that of identifying, on a cost basis alone, specific decision issues. An example is if one discovers that the total cost chargeable to [] one might conclude that this constitutes a decision issue. The resolution of any decision issue can not be achieved by knowing costs alone, however well broken down or presented. What is also desperately needed is the effectiveness of the alternatives available on the decision issue. Thus, while TOD serves and can serve the very useful purposes above (and together with judgment, past experience, etc., can permit probably better resolution of decision issues than is possible with less complete cost information), we must examine ways to get effectiveness information.


3. The philosophy of TOD is: "get all cost data so that specific decision related data will surely be available." Instead of gathering effectiveness on an as needed basis, one could envisage an effectiveness data bank similar to the TOD cost data bank. This effectiveness data bank, which could be called Target Oriented Effectiveness Display (TOED), if achievable, would serve the same two purposes as TOD, i. e., furnish readily available data with

respect to specific decision issues, and give leads to decision issue identification. I am not completely sure if a useable TOED can be achieved, but in an evolutionary way, I believe that it can.

4. Prior to the existence of TOD, the decision making process on intelligence programs generally was as follows:




5. Adding the TOD could be conceived as modifying the process as follows:



In effect TOD has furnished better cost data to the decision making process at all levels, but to serve the BoB/DCI/SecDef level has imposed a new function, that of integration. For the TOD cost data this functional process is conceptually simple. It consists of adding or grouping dollars in a convenient form to assist in identifying and resolving decision issues.

6. If one assumes the feasibility of a TOED, the decision process is modified as follows:



Here the TOED has furnished probably better effectiveness information at all decision making levels, but again to serve the BoB/DCI/SecDef level there is another new functional task, that of integrating TOED data. (This task also exists, as is also true in TOD, at all levels). But the integration is not now a simple addition process since redundancy, gaps, and non-linear combinations exist. This integration of effectiveness, though a formidable problem, has been attacked with a great deal of vigor and with a limited degree of success in many studies over the past year. In fact the existence of an acceptable solution to this integration problem is at least strongly indicated by work on the ICBM, the ABM, and the ELINT problems.

7. One other new functional task is created by adding TOED inputs, that is, the combining of TOD and TOED inputs into a cost-effectiveness display. This does not appear at this time to be difficult since it would likely consist of selection, grouping, and combining (by appropriate rules) information defined by the decision issue and readily available in the integrated TOD and TOED.

8. There is a third element important to the decision making process; not necessarily directly related to the development and use of TOD and TOED. This is the necessity of having available identified alternative courses of action with respect to decision issues. Currently, except for the CIP, program submissions at all levels are generally characterized by a lack of alternatives, leaving decision makers either a yes-no answer or requesting alternatives on a case-by-case basis. One can visualize an incremental growth towards this third goal by starting with a general specification that all decision issues identified at any level should be forwarded with alternatives (together with TOD and TOED data on each alternative).

9. Following is a time phased schedule to achieve the three goals, first, introduction and continued development of TOD; second, development, introduction, and continued development of TOED; and, third, acquiring appropriate alternatives.

Step I - TOD

a) Specify that TOD data (in its present format and detail) covering the five years (1969-1973) of the next budget submission to be available to the TOD integration by 1 November 1968.

- b) To achieve (a) it is necessary to alert subordinate units as soon as possible.
- c) Starting now, all out of cycle PCR's will include TOD data (current format and detail) for five years.
- d) Modification to detail or format of TOD will be accomplished only once annually and will be effective for the first year in March 1969.
- e) NIPE will accomplish the TOD integration.

Step II - TOED

- a) Start now to develop first draft format and detail of a TOED, data for FY 1969 to be available by 1 April 1969.
- b) Specify that TOED data (in April 1969 format and detail) covering the five years (1970-1974) of the budget submission to be available to TOED integration by 1 August 1969.
- c) To achieve (b) it will be necessary to alert subordinate units no later than 1 April 1969.
- d) Starting in 1 April 1969, all out of cycle PCR's will include TOED data (current format and detail) for five years.
- e) Modification to detail or format of TOED will be accepted only annually starting in March 1970.
- f) NIPE will accomplish the TOED integration and the TOD/TOED combining.

Step III - Alternatives

- a) Starting now all out of cycle PCR's will include alternatives.
- b) On all decision issues (identified at any level) alternatives will be included in the next budget submission.

10. The major characteristic of this recommended phased approach is that NIPE is charged with a major role in the process. This charge is, I believe, quite in consonance with the present charter and, furthermore, it is a workable arrangement. One of the major and absolutely necessary prerequisites is for the TOD-TOED integration and combining to be done by a non-parochial group. Any committee made up of representatives must face the fact that representation of an agency carries implicitly agency loyalty, and, hence, parochialism. Prior to the tremendously successful accomplishments of MacNamara-Hitch-Enthoven in bringing logic and reason to bear on force decisions, there were countless joint committees which universally failed. True, compromises were arrived at and decisions were made, but, in general, these committee compromises (even those made by the JCS itself) resulted more from personalities, log-rolling, power plays, status quo maintenance, and "art of the possible" rather than an analytic grasp of relative cost and overall national effectiveness. The USIB structure is a living example where beneath the patina of smoothness, parochial motives are the rule. The net effect of the USIB modus operandi is to dilute the impact, effectiveness, responsibilities, and authority of the DCI. In practice, joint committees do respond to parochial motives and, in theory, they must always do so. In my view, it is just not possible for a joint committee to act solely on the basis of national motives. In theory at least NIPE can do this while at the same time maintain a sensitive appreciation of the very real and often strong agency motives. Finally, I believe that NIPE has already been charged to fill the role outlined in this memo, a role which is in reality the accomplishment of program evaluation in response to national motives.

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